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Abstract  
Growth economists still face challenges and limitations to incorporate institutions into the 
standard growth framework. This article develops a simple augmented Solow growth model that 
accounts for the interactions between institutions and factor-productivity and examine the 
impacts of the quality of institutions on levels and growth rates of output. The institutions 
augmented growth model shows that differences in the quality of institutions preclude 
convergence and determine both the level and the growth rate of output per worker. The model 
also shows that poor institutions induce poverty traps. Furthermore, the income gap between rich 
and poor countries will increase if poor countries’ institutions do not improve relative to their 
rich counterpart. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent work in the growth literature has placed institutions as one of the engines of long-
run economic growth (Chong and Calderón, 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; 
Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008). However, growth economists still face enormous challenges and 
limitations in terms of modeling institutions into the standard theoretical framework of economic 
growth. According to Sala-i-Martin (2002), “[w]e are still in the early stages when it comes to 
incorporating institutions into our growth theories” (p. 18). Important theoretical contributions in 
terms of modeling institutions within the realm of long-run economic growth include Huang and 
Xu (1999), Fedderke (2001), Gradstein (2002 and 2004), and Tebaldi and Elmslie (2008). 
This article develops a simple institutions augmented Solow model that accounts for the 
impacts of the quality of institutions on levels and growth rates of output. In particular, we 
modify the production function and the capital accumulation equation found in the traditional 
Solow model allowing for interactions between institutions and factor-productivity. Despite the 
simplicity of the model, it theorizes a formal link for specifying an empirical model for studying 
the impacts of institutions on economic performance. The workable theoretical institutions-
augmented Solow model also allows analyzing the role of poor/good institutions in creating club 
convergence and/or poverty traps.  
2. THE MODEL 
The model economy is a modified version of the Solow (1956) model. Goods are 
produced using a constant return to scale (CRS) technology in a market characterized by perfect 
competition. Institutions are assumed to play a central role in determining factors’ productivity 
and technology adoption, so output (Y) is produced using the following production function: 
                                               ),(),,(),,( tTLtTKtTAfY  (1) 
where L denotes labor,  is an index denoting the level of state-of-art technology, K is 
capital, T is an index denoting the quality of institutions, and t is time.  
We assume that the representative economy is small and has access to a pool of 
technology generated exogenously that grows at a constant rate of g.  In addition, the growth rate 
of the labor force and the labor force participation rate are constant over time, which implies that 
, where n is the population growth rate. Moreover, T is assumed to be increasing with the 
quality of institutions that accounts for the enforcement of contracts and property rights, 
perceptions that the judiciary system is predictable and effective, transparency of the public 
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administration, control of corruption and pro-market regulations (e.g., no price controls). For 
simplicity, T is treated as a constant and normalized to range between zero and one (
 Therefore,  is equal to one for an economy with the best relative institutions.  
Equation 1 poses a major question: how do institutions affect the adoption of available 
technologies and the productivity of physical capital?
1
 It can be argued that poor institutions 
prevent the use of available technologies (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008) and limit the efficiency 
gains from current innovation (Matthews, 1986). Therefore, good (bad) institutions increase 
(decrease) the efficacy of technology and augment both labor and capital productivity. With 
respect to capital, it has been shown that poor institutional arrangements (translated into 
corruption and poor enforcement of laws and contracts) decrease the returns to investments and 
reduce capital accumulation (Mauro, 1995; Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder, 1997; Lambsdorff, 
1999; Wei, 2000). We consider these ideas by developing two alternative specifications.
2
 First, 
we ignore the impacts of institutions on technology adoption and focus the analysis on the 
influences of institution on physical capital productivity. Then we develop a more general model 
that accounts for the impacts of institutions on technology adoption and capital productivity. In 
both specifications we also examine the case of institutions-driven club convergence and/or 
poverty traps. 
2.1 Baseline model  
This section presents a heuristic way to account for the impacts of institution on physical 
capital productivity. In particular, we assume that the elasticity of output with respect to capital 
is affected by institutions. More precisely, better institutions augment capital productivity and, 
therefore, influence the contribution of capital to output. Formally: 
 (2) 
where 10 . Defining   and  allows writing the production function as follows: 
 (3) 
Combining equation (3) with the capital accumulation equation produces: 
 (4) 
                                                 
1
  Another relevant question is: how do institutions affect technology adoption and human capital accumulation?  
   While important, this is not the focus of our current paper and could be addressed in future research. 
 
2
  Although restrictive, this specification generates a workable model. Other general functional specifications have  
   created difficulties in solving the model.  
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Equation 4 implies that the economy will converge to a balanced growth path where 
. This allows solving equation (4) for the steady state capital stock:  
 (5) 
where “*” denotes steady state values. Equation 5 implies that institutions impact positively the 
steady state stock of capital and, consequently, the steady state level of output per effective 
worker.  To be precise, better institutions (larger T) increases the return to capital accumulation, 
which boosts investments and leads to a higher steady-state effective capital  and effective 
output per worker . However, the long-term growth rate of output per worker is still 
determined by the rate of technological progress. Defining , using the fact that  ,  and 
log-differentiating equation 3 generates: 
 (6) 
Therefore, this simple model suggests that countries are richer or poorer because of the 
quality of their institutions. Equation 5 implies that wealthier countries should have better 
institutions than poorer countries. Equation 6 entails that there should be no effect of the quality 
of institutions in a country’s long run growth rate. Therefore, institutions have level effects but 
not growth effects. The lack of growth effects found in equation 6 above is inconsistent with the 
existing growth literature (see details in Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008) and is further examined 
below. 
This modified-Solow model also formalizes the idea that poor institutions might induce 
poverty traps and club convergence.
3
 Equation 4, simply depicted in Figure 1, implies that the 
quality of institutions generates different steady states. Consider two economies with identical , 
n, g, savings rate (s), technology (A), and initial stock of capital , but economy P is endowed 
with poor institutions (  ) relatively to economy R, so that  . The model implies that the 
differences in the quality of institutions will produce different steady states indicated by 
*
Pk and 
*
Rk . Country P will growth until reaching 
*
Pk  and stuck at that point.  On the other hand, 
country R, which has identical initial conditions, but is endowed with better institutions (TR), 
                                                 
3
   The literature also shows that non-constant savings (Galor and Ryder, 1989), learning-by-doing and spillover 
effects (Barro, 1995) might generate poverty traps. 
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will grow steadily reaching a higher steady state 
*
Rk . The lower steady state 
*
Pk  can be 
interpreted as a poverty trap for a country that is endowed with poor institutions. Therefore, the 
model suggests that poor institutions might create poverty traps and the only way to escape it is 
through improvements in the quality of institutions. This result is consistent with North (1990), 
who questioned the ability of societies to eradicate an eventual inferior institutional framework 
that prevents poor countries to close the income gap with rich countries. 
Figure 1: Institutions and Club Convergence 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Extended Model  
The literature suggests that institutions might create difficulties (e.g. labor market 
imperfections - restrictive labor contracts, or union’s bargaining power, and/or government 
regulation) to utilize available technologies (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008; Baldwin and Lin, 2002, 
Haucap and Wey, 2004). It has also been argued that better institutional arrangements enable 
economic agents “to cooperate with one another more efficiently” (Matthews, 1986: 908) which 
ultimately boost factors’ productivity. We account for these ideas by formally extending the 
baseline model. In particular, we re-specify the production function as follows: 
 (7) 
Equation 7 incorporates the impacts of institutions on output in a traditional Solow 
production function. Since T is a normalized measure of institutional quality ranging from zero 
to one, an economy with the relative best institutions (T=1) would have a production function 
 
 
y, s 
s 
(  + n + g)k 
s 
*
Rk  
*
Pk  k 0k  
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identical to the one used in the standard Solow model.
4
 However, not all countries will have 
similar quality of institutions. Therefore, the Solow model is a particular case when institutions 
play no role in affecting the production process.
5
 Moreover, the term  accounts for the 
external effect of institutions on technology adoption and total factor productivity. It implies that 
a country with poor institutions will be unable to fully benefit from the potential productivity 
gains generated by available technologies. The model is solved by defining   and 
, which allows us to write the production in terms of per effective labor: 
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 (8) 
The per effective capital accumulation equation is given by: 
 (9) 
This model has a well-behaved steady state solution in which . Thus: 
 (10) 
The extended model implies that institutions impact the long-run level and growth rate of 
output per worker. Defining , using the fact that , and log-differentiating equation 7 
generates: 
 (11) 
Therefore, the model implies that the growth rate of the output per worker is not only 
determined by technological change, but also affected by the quality of institutions. An economy 
may have access to state-of-art technology, but its poor institutions may hinder the adoption of 
available technologies and diminish the productivity of factors of production, which impede 
economic growth. Institutions also affect the time path level of output per worker. Figure 2 
depicts the case in which an economy is growing at the rate  and subsequently, at time tk, an 
exogenous shock improves the quality of institutions from  to  ( ). The improvement 
                                                 
4
    
5
   Equation 6 also satisfies the Constant Return to Scale (CRS) assumption, that is, if  is a nonnegative constant, 
then:  . 
6
   It is worth noticing that our definition of “effective labor” accounts not only for the state-of-art technology but 
also for the quality of institutions.  
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in the quality of institutions causes a once-for-all change in the trajectory of the level of output 
per worker. 
Figure 2: Institutional Quality and Time Path of GDP per worker 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The influence of institutions on output per worker originates not only from its impacts on 
transitional and steady state technological efficiency, but also from its impacts on capital 
accumulation. Institutions affect the marginal product of capital and therefore impact 
investments and capital accumulation. In particular, given that the ratio  is constant around the 
steady state, deriving equation 8 with respect to k and evaluating its derivative around the steady 
state produces: 
 (12) 
This implies that improvement in the quality of institutions has a proportional impact on 
the steady state marginal product of capital. In other words, good institutions increase the returns 
to investments, which ultimately boost capital accumulation, leading to high level of output per 
worker. This result is consistent with empirical studies that find that capital accumulation is 
adversely affected by poor institutions (Mauro, 1995; Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder, 1997; Wei, 
2000).  
The extended modified-Solow model also predicts that poor institutions induce club 
convergence. Consider a case in which shows two economies (R and P) have identical , n, g, 
savings rate (s), technology (A), initial stock of capital  and institutions, which implies that 
 
 
 
kt  t 
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that income per worker in these economies are also equal ( . However, at time , 
economy R experiences an institutional shock that permanently improves the quality of its 
institutions, so that  . Using the fact that the long-term trajectory of the output per worker 
is determined based on equation 11, we can easily derive the trajectory of the relative output per 
capita  of these two economies. Figure 3 shows that the differences in the quality of 
institutions will generate an income gap that increases over time. The increasing income gap can 
be interpreted as the institutions-induced club convergence and/or poverty trap.  
Figure 3: Institutions-induced Club Convergence  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we modify the traditional Solow production and capital accumulation 
equations and allows for interactions between institutions and factor-productivity. The 
institutions augmented Solow growth model shows that differences in the quality of institutions 
preclude convergence and determine both the level and growth rate of output per worker. The 
model also shows that poor institutions induce poverty traps and the income gap between rich 
and poor countries will increase if poor countries’ institutions do not improve relative to their 
rich counterparts. 
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